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The Carefully
Orchestrated Campaign1
by Nadine Strossen 2 & Caitlin Borgmann3

question, "Can
he answer to the
partial-birth
abortions
be banned?" is an emphatic
"No." The nonmedical term,
"partial-birth abortion," is a
political chimera, with amorphous, shifting definitions concocted by opponents of women's
reproductive rights. Because of
their vague and broad wording,
so-called "partial-birth abortion"
bans operate as virtual abortion
bans, prohibiting even the safest
and most common abortion
procedures used throughout
pregnancy. Accordingly, almost
every single judge who has ruled
on these bans - in 17 out of 18
cases to date - has enjoined
4
their enforcement.
In addition to holding that
these bans impose an undue
burden on a woman's right to

T

choose abortion, due to their
sweeping prohibition of virtually
all abortion procedures, the
courts also have held "partialbirth abortion" bans unconstitutional for several other independently sufficient reasons: they
violate physicians' due process
rights, since their vague terminology subjects physicians to
criminal prosecution and punishment without fair notice; they
lack constitutionally required
exceptions to preserve women's
life and health; and they vest
spouses and parents with impermissible veto power over a
woman's right to choose.
Anti-choice activists have
performed a remarkable sleight
of hand, convincing many lawmakers, as well as much of the
media and the public, that
"partial-birth abortion" bans
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target a specific, "late-term"
abortion procedure, which they
depict in grisly terms. In thus
distorting every element of what
is actually at stake in the "partial-birth abortion" debate,
opponents of women's reproductive freedom have served their
goal of diverting public attention from the pregnant woman
to the fetus.
A striking contrast is afforded by the courts that have
focused on the "partial-birth
abortion" bans that have been
passed in various states by
scrutinizing their language and
legislative history, and hearing
medical testimony about their
impact. Almost unanimously,
these courts have concluded that
the bans are not confined to
either a particular procedure or
a particular stage of pregnancy,
and that the bans undermine
women's health and rights
without advancing any
countervailing legitimate interest in protecting potential fetal
life.5
These judicial rulings highlight the flaws of the vague and
sweeping prohibitions as they
have been written to date. But,
even assuming that the bans
could be reformulated to target
"only" a single abortion procedure and/or stage of pregnancy,
they would still be unconstitutional. The practice of medicine
is both complex and fluid. One
can never rule out the possibility that a situation will arise in

which a given abortion procedure will be the safest for a
specific patient in a particular
circumstance. It would be both
unconscionable and unconstitutional for the government to
eliminate from a physician's
options a procedure that would
be the most medically appropriate for certain patients.
L An Examination of
"Partial-Birth
Abortion" Bans
The term "partial-birth
abortion" is not recognized in
the medical community. Moreover, much of the rhetoric surrounding the bans is wholly
unmoored from their actual
wording. For example, the bans'
proponents invoke inflammatory
imagery of fetuses late in pregnancy, or suctioning of fetal
skull contents. But the bans
themselves contain no such
references. Accordingly, any
meaningful discussion of
whether "partial-birth abortion"
can be banned must begin with
a careful look at the actual
wording and scope of the bans
and a review of the political
context in which they arose.
The bans to date have taken
two principal forms. The first,
which was incorporated in Congress's initial "partial-birth
abortion" ban, passed in 1995
and subsequently vetoed, defines a "partial-birth abortion"
as "an abortion in which the

Strossen and Borgmann

person performing the abortion
partially vaginally delivers a
living fetus before killing the
fetus and completing the delivery."6 The second formulation,
which was incorporated in
Congress's amended ban passed
in 1997 and then vetoed, retains
the original definition of "partial-birth abortion" as "an abortion in which the person performing the abortion partially
vaginally delivers a living fetus
before killing the fetus and
completing the delivery." But,
the amended bill then defines
that phrase to mean "deliberately and intentionally delivers
into the vagina a living fetus, or
a substantial portion there of,
for the purpose of performing a
procedure the physician knows
will kill the fetus, and kills the
fetus."7 Neither version is limited to any particular stage of
pregnancy. Thus, when proponents claim that the bans reach
only abortions performed late in
pregnancy, they mislead the
public and distort the debate.
Neither the term "partialbirth abortion" nor the two
principal legislative definitions
are medical in origin. Rather,
these concepts were devised by
anti-choice activists in the mid1990s, and no medical consensus
as to their meaning has yet
emerged. In the words of Dr.
Ralph W. Hale, Executive Vice
President of the American
College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG): "Con-

tinually repeating a politically
coined term does not confer
legitimacy - medical or otherwise - on that term or on dangerous legislation."
The chimerical nature of the
term "partial-birth abortion" is
not surprising when one considers its politically charged origins. The so-called partial-birth
abortion ban is the product of a
carefully orchestrated campaign
launched by the National Right
to Life Committee (NRLC). The
ban was contrived following a
1992 National Abortion Federation Risk Management Seminar,
where a well-respected physician
and abortion provider, Dr. Martin Haskell, gave a presentation
on a particular abortion technique he had developed: "dilation and extraction" or "D&X."
His monograph fell into the
hands of anti-choice activists.
The NRLC first tried to use the
monograph to galvanize opposition to the then-pending federal
Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA).
NRLC ads urging opposition to
FOCA depicted and described "a
gruesome new abortion technique" called "D&X."9 Soon after
FOCA's defeat, its opponents
invented the more incendiary
term, "partial-birth abortion,"
along with a non medical definition that deviated dramatically
from the description in Dr.
Haskell's monograph.
In 1997, the NRLC distributed model language for a partial-birth abortion ban to its

Nexus
state affiliates across the country. The accompanying memorandum prescribed certain
crucial elements, including an
approved definition of partialbirth abortion and the omission
of an exception to preserve
women's health. The NRLC
denounced any ban that would
apply "only after "viability' or
'in the third trimester', or would
contain a health exception, as a
"phony ban." Finally, the NRLC
"strongly advise[d] against any
changes in the name of the
banned procedure or in the
definition of that procedure,"
pointing out that discussion
about the definition's scope
would serve the useful goal of
"focus[ing] the discussion on the
grisly mechanics of late-term
abortions." 10
The NRLC's memorandum
evidences a central purpose
underlying the drive for "partial-birth abortion" bans: to
draw public concern to the fetus
and away from the health,
welfare, and constitutional
rights of the pregnant woman.
Concerns about fetal well-being
are elevated by referring to
fetuses as "babies." In contrast,
concerns about the pregnant
woman's well-being are denigrated and attacked as inherently suspect by enclosing the
term "health" in quotation
marks whenever it refers to her.

H. "Partial-BirthAbortion"
in Congress and State
Legislatures
A bill embodying the concocted concept of "partial-birth
abortion" was introduced in
Congress in 1995. The bill, H.R.
1833, banned all partial-birth
abortions at any stage of pregnancy. It contained the first
version of the definition described above, and no exception
to preserve the woman's health,
with only a dangerously narrow
exception to preserve her life. It
also created a cause of action for
civil damages for violations of its
provisions. With certain limited
exceptions, the bill authorized
suits by the "father" of the fetus,
if married to the woman at the
time of the abortion, as well as
by "the maternal grandparents"
of the fetus, if the woman was
less than eighteen years old at
the time of the abortion. The
104th Congress passed this
unprecedented restriction on
abortion - the first time Congress had outlawed any abortion
procedure - but it failed to
become law when President
Clinton vetoed it in 1996. The
President said that he could not
sign legislation that reflected
"congressional indifference to
women's health." Congress tried
to override his veto but fell a few
votes short in the Senate.
The ban was reintroduced in
Congress in 1997 as H.R. 1122.
Although it was substantially
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the same as H.R. 1833, several
amendments proposed by Senator Rick Santorum were subsequently adopted to garner the
endorsement of the American
Medical Association. 1 With
these changes, H. R. 1122 embodied the second version of the
definition described above. H.R.
1122 passed both Houses of
Congress but again was vetoed
by President Clinton. The
House voted to override the veto
but the Senate fell three votes
shy of an override on September
18, 1998. By mid-1998, 27
states had passed "partial-birth
abortion" bans, nearly all of
them modeled on one of the
federal bills.12

m. "Partial-Birth
Abortion" Bans Are
Unconstitutional
As noted above, almost all
courts that have considered
constitutional challenges to
these bans have concluded that
they suffer from a range of
constitutional infirmities, which
will be discussed in turn.
A. Two Versions of the Same
Far-Reaching Ban, Imposing an Unconstitutional "Undue Burden"
on Abortion Rights
In the course of lawsuits
challenging the first version of
"partial-birth abortion" bans, it
became clear that the definition
any procedure in which the

physician "partially vaginally
delivers a living fetus before
killing the fetus and completing
the delivery" - does not pinpoint a single, specific abortion
technique. Rather, physicians
testified and judges found that
the definition potentially encompasses the safest and most
common abortion methods used
throughout pregnancy. 3 The
central problem with the definition is that it is based on delivery into the vagina. But that is
the way the vast majority of
abortions are performed. The
only non vaginal methods of
performing an abortion - hysterotomy and hysterectomy necessitate cutting through the
abdomen. 14 These methods
pose such high risks to a
woman's health and fertility
that they are used only in extremely rare circumstances.
And because abortions necessarily involve the death of the fetus,
virtually every method of vaginal abortion - i.e., virtually
every method by which almost
all abortions are performed potentially falls within the ban's
vast sweep.
The amended version of the
proposed congressional ban,
H.R. 1122, was touted as narrowing the all-encompassing
scope of its initial incarnation.
However, courts addressing
challenges to comparable state
bans have concluded that the
revisions do not cure the constitutional problems.15 Recall that
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the amended bill retains its
predecessor's core definition of
the banned abortions: any in
which the physician "partially
vaginally delivers a living fetus
before killing the fetus and
completing the delivery," but it
then defines that phrase to
mean "deliberately and intentionally delivers into the vagina
a living fetus, or a substantial
portion thereof, for the purpose
of performing a procedure the
physician knows will kill the
fetus, and kills the fetus."
This revised definition continues to use non medical terms.
And, it continues to threaten the
safest and most common methods of abortion. Once again, the
definition focuses on delivery
into the vagina. The purported
limitation to only those procedures that have a particular
purpose - namely, to "kill the
fetus" - at most immunizes
obstetrical procedures, performed out of necessity when an
intended childbirth goes awry.
It offers no comfort to physicians
performing abortions or to
women seeking them. Finally,
the addition of the vague term
"substantial portion" does nothing to clarify what is meant by
"partially vaginally delivers."
Anti-choice proponents of
"partial-birth abortion" bans
respond to these persistent
definitional problems in two
inconsistent ways. On the one
hand, such advocates insist that
they know what the bans pro-

hibit. On the other hand, when
pressed, these same advocates
have been unwilling to identify
precisely which medical procedures are banned. For example,
Representative Charles Canady,
a sponsor of the federal ban,
signed a letter to House colleagues declaring that "H.R.
1833 does not ban [only] 'D&X'
[dilation and extraction] or
'Brain Suction' abortions....
The ban would have the effect of
prohibiting any abortion in
which a child was partially
delivered and then killed - no
matter what the abortionist
decides to call his particular
technique.' 1 6 The bans' proponents frequently have refused to
adopt a narrower medical definition on the ground that to do so
would enable physicians to
evade the bans by modifying
their practices. 7
In short, the broad sweep of
the bans' language effectuates
the proponents' goal: to outlaw
not a single, specific procedure,
but rather any of a number of
procedures a physician might
use. In other words, the amorphous language is not the accidental product of poor draftsmanship, but instead precisely
reflects and promotes its proponents' goal of criminalizing and
deterring as many abortions as
possible. That was the conclusion of the Alaska Superior
Court in invalidating that
state's "partial-birth abortion"
ban. The court explained that

Strossen and Borgmann

since the legislature had enacted the ban "with knowledge
of the legal defects, it seems
more likely than not that the
unstated purpose of the Act was
to cloud the scope of abortion
procedures, i.e., to restrict abortion in general." 8
Because of their vast sweep,
so-called "partial-birth abortion" bans
threaten
the core
right to
choose
abortion.
In 1992, in
Planned
Parenthood
v. Casey, the
Supreme
Court
reaffirmed
the general
principle
dating back
to Roe v.
Wade that
the government may
not prohibit
a woman
from making the ultimate decision, in
accordance with her own conscience, to have an abortion of a
nonviable fetus.19 Under Casey, a
pre-viability abortion restriction
is unconstitutional if it places an
"undue burden" on a woman's
right to choose abortion - that
is, if it "has the purpose or effect
of placing a substantial obstacle

in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion."2 °
The "partial-birth abortion"
bans impose not only a substantial obstacle, but far worse, an
absolute barrier to many abortions that are now safe and
legal. This is so both because of
the broad range of procedures
the bans encompass and because
they are not
limited to
any particular stage of
pregnancy.
Courts that
have reviewed laws
modeled on
both versions of the
federal
legislation
have found
that they
encompass
the safest
and most
common
abortion
procedures2
and that
they could
prohibit abortions as early as
the first trimester.22
This conclusion was reached,
for example, by a federal district
court in Illinois, which struck
down that state's ban. After
hearing extensive medical
testimony, the court held that
the state statute imposed "an
undue burden on a woman s

"The partial-birth
abortion bans
impose not only a
substantial
obstacle, but far
worse, an absolute
barrier to many
abortions that are
now safe and
legal."
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constitutional right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy before
viability" because "virtually
every abortion procedure" could
violate the ban,23 including "the
most common and safest abortion procedures... without
regard for the viability of the
fetus.2
B. An Unconstitutionally
Vague Definition
The Due Process Clause
prohibits any law so vague that
persons "of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its
application."25 Vague laws
violate the due process guarantee in two ways. First, they fail
to provide the persons regulated
with a "reasonable opportunity
to know what conduct is prohibited so that [they] may act accordingly. '26 The "partial-birth
abortion" bans, with their vague
and non medical terms, require
doctors to guess whether performing a procedure that is
medically appropriate nevertheless falls within the ban's proscriptions. Dr. Timothy R.B.
Johnson, a court-appointed
expert for a federal district court
in Michigan, testified that it was
"not entirely clear to [him] as a
physician" what the definition of
"partial-birth abortion" in that
state's ban meant, nor was it
clear to him which procedures
the statute encompassed.
Based on this and other testi-

mony, the court concluded that
physicians "simply cannot know
with any degree of confidence"
which abortion methods the ban
prohibits, and it therefore enjoined the ban.28
"Partial-birth abortion"
bans also embody the second
due process vice of unconstitutionally vague laws: by failing to
provide explicit standards for
those who apply them, the bans
"impermissibly delegate basic
policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries for resolution
on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminato--y application."2 '1 In striking
down Alaska's ban, the Alaska
Superior Court stressed this
defect, noting that "[t]he broad
sweep of the language involved
could allow broad enforcement
against most, if not all, abortion
procedures depending on the
choice of the prosecuting attor30
ney."
C. An Impermissible
Endangerment of
Women's Health and
Lives
By prohibiting the safest and
most common abortion methods,
"partial-birth abortion" bans
compromise women's health and
drastically limit physicians'
discretion to choose the most
medically appropriate abortion
method for their patients. If
doctors stopped providing all
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abortion services that are potentially covered by a ban, abortions could become virtually
impossible to obtain. In Wisconsin, where the ban threatened
physicians with sentences as
severe as life imprisonment,
doctors ceased performing any
abortions for a week after the
law went into effect. Doctors did
not resume abortion services
until they received assurances
from prosecutors that, pending
resolution of the lawsuit challenging the ban's constitutionality, they would not be prosecuted
for performing first-trimester
abortions.'
Courts have recognized the
extent to which "partial-birth
abortion" bans endanger
women's lives and health. A
federal court in Arkansas enjoined that state's ban after
finding that it would have the
effect of denying women "appropriate medical care." 32 Similarly, the court that enjoined
Montana's ban found it would
"increase the amount of risk and
pain that must be suffered by
the woman."33
Moreover, most of the proposed bans fail to provide adequate exceptions to protect a
woman's life or health. Those
omissions alone render the bans
unconstitutional. The government may never, even in the
latest stages of pregnancy,
prohibit abortions that are
necessary to preserve women's
lives or health. 4 Indeed, in

PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,
the Supreme Court began its
review of a multi-pronged abortion statute by examining the
adequacy of the medical emergency exception, "[b]ecause it is
central to the operation of various other requirements." 5 The
Court stressed that if it determined this exception to be
insifficiently protective of a
woman's health, it "would be
required to invalidate" all of
Pennsylvania's abortion restrictions because "the essential
holding of Roe forbids a State
from interfering with a woman's
choice to undergo an abortion
procedure if continuing her
pregnancy would constitute a
threat to her health."36
Yet nearly all of the "partialbirth abortion" bans enacted in
the states, as well as both versions of the federal bill, apply to
procedures performed throughout pregnancy and contain no
health exception whatsoever.
Thus, they will bar some women
from obtaining an abortion,
even when continuing the pregnancy seriously threatens their
health. As courts have held, this
feature alone is constitutionally
damning.
Even if the bans succeeded in
targeting a single procedure, the
lack of a health exception would
constitute a fatal constitutional
flaw. Since the medical appropriateness of any safe abortion
procedure will depend on factors
unique to the circumstances of
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each patient - such as her
medical condition, the stage of
gestation, and the expertise of
the physician performing the
procedure - there will always
be some women for whom the
banned procedure is the safest.
By removing a safe medical
procedure from the physician's
array of options without providing a health exception, the bans
irreparably harm some women
by forcing them to undergo
other procedures that put them
at greater risk.
While it's bad - and unconstitutional - enough that "partial-birth abortion" bans do not
protect women's health, worse
yet, they fail to afford adequate
protection even when a woman's
very life is at stake. For example, the federal bill that just
narrowly escaped enactment
permits a physician to perform a
banned procedure only when it
is "necessary to save the life of a
mother whose life is endangered
by a physical disorder, illness, or
'38
injury.
This statutory language is
insufficiently protective of
women's lives in a couple of
respects.3 9 First, by enumerating
certain life-endangering circumstances under which the procedure could be carried out, the
lawmakers apparently intended
to exclude others. But at no
stage in pregnancy may the
government pick and choose
among various life-threatening
conditions from which it is

willing to protect women.4 °
Moreover, because the ban is
lifted only when "a partial birth
abortion ... is necessary" to save
the woman's life, the physician
must first resort to any other
procedure - such as hysterotomy or hysterectomy - that
would save her life, even if that
method poses grave risks to her
health and fertility.41 Yet the
Supreme Court consistently has
barred the government from
subordinating a woman's health
to its interest in fetal welfare. In
Colautti v. Franklin,for example, the Supreme Court
struck down a requirement that
physicians "employ the abortion
technique best suited to fetal
survival 'so long as a different
technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life
or health of the mother.' ,,42 In so
ruling, the Court noted that "the
word 'necessary' suggests that a
particular technique must be
indispensable to the woman's life
or health - not merely desirable - before it may be
adopted. '43 Consequently, the
Court found, "it is uncertain
whether the statute permits the
physician to consider his duty to
the patient to be paramount to
his duty to the fetus."44 The
Court held that this ambiguity
was constitutionally unacceptable. Likewise, "partial-birth
abortion" bans suffer from the
same constitutional infirmity, in
failing to'give physicians unambiguous authority to follow the
course of action that best promotes the woman's health.
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D. Unconstitutional Spousal
and Parental Consent
Requirements
As previously noted, "partial-birth abortion" bans authorize the "father" and "maternal
grandparents" of a fetus to sue
physicians for violating the
bans. Therefore, the bans effectively require physicians to
obtain the consent of those third
parties before performing any
abortions that might violate the
ban. And since the bans sweep
so broadly, doctors would need to
obtain this consent before utilizing even the most common
abortion procedures. The civil
liability provision thus grants
husbands and parents veto
power over the woman's abortion
decision, which is blatantly
unconstitutional.
Striking down a provision
that required spousal notification - in contrast with consent
the Casey Court held that no
husband has the "right to require a [woman] to advise him
before she exercises her personal
choices."45 The Court declared
that such a requirement "embodies a view of marriage...
repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and of the
nature of the rights secured by
the Constitution. Women do not
lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they
marry."46 Accordingly, a provi-

sion that effectively forces a
woman to obtain her husband's
consent before she can have an
abortion is an even worse violation of these same principles.
For this reason, a federal district
court in Arizona invalidated the
provision of that state's "partial-birth abortion" ban authorizing "fathers" to bring civil
actions.47
The bans' parental consent
requirement is equally unconstitutional. No court has ever
before considered, let alone
upheld, a parental consent
requirement attached to a ban
on certain abortion procedures,
and it is difficult to discern what
state interest would support
such a requirement. As to abortion in general, the Supreme
Court has held that the government may require a minor to
obtain parental consent only if it
also provides a confidential and
expeditious "judicial bypass"
procedure - i.e., a procedure
whereby a judge may determine
either (1) that the particular
minor is sufficiently mature to
make her own decision to have
an abortion, or (2) that an abortion is in her best interest. 48 But
no such bypass is afforded by the
"partial-birth abortion" bans,
therefore constituting yet another ground on which they
have been held unconstitutional.4 9
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E. No Legitimate State
Interest
In enacting abortion restrictions, the government must of
course seek to further legitimate
ends. While the Casey Court
recognized that "the State has
legitimate interests in the
health of the woman and in
protecting the potential life
within her, "50 so-called "partialbirth abortion" bans serve
neither of these interests. To
the contrary, far from promoting
women's health, these bans have
the opposite effect.
Nor do the bans promote a
legitimate state interest in
potential life. The Casey Court
held that "measures designed to
advance this interest [in potential life] will not be invalidated
as long as their purpose is to
persuade the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion" and
the measures do not impose "an
undue burden on the right."5

In

contrast, a restriction that is
"designed to strike at the right
itself" 52 does not permissibly

further the state's interest in
potential life. By sweeping so
broadly as to erect a virtual
barrier to the safest and most
common methods of abortion,
"partial-birth abortion" bans
cross the divide between permissible persuasion and prohibited
coercion. 53 This thwarting of

women's attempts to obtain safe
abortions is wholly at odds with
the Casey Court's insistence that

the state may not "deprive
women of the ultimate decision"
to end their pregnancies.54 Even
if the bans could be rewritten to
target a single procedure, they
still would not further the interest in potential life. They would
merely bar women who had
already decided to end their
pregnancies from utilizing one
method for doing so. Without
advancing the state's interest in
potential life one whit, such a
bar would serve only to reduce
safe medical options for women.
IV. Bans on Safe Abortion
Procedures Threaten
the Quality and
Progress of Medical
Practice
The practice of medicine is
not stagnant. We know and
expect that physicians continually question existing methods
and experiment with new techniques or with variants of recognized techniques. This process
of evaluation and experimentation ensures the development of
ever safer and more effective
medical procedures. Abortion
practice is no exception. Methods of abortion that were once
considered the standard of care
have been virtually abandoned,
while other methods once
thought experimental are now
the most common.
For example, until the
middle of this century, the most
widely used abortion method
was a procedure called hystero-
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tomy. This is essentially a preterm caesarean section, but it is
significantly more dangerous.
These dangers were known even
at the time that hysterotomy
was the most common abortion
technique. However, "so long as
the whole subject of abortion was
regarded as quasi-legal and
disreputable,... innovatory
practitioners were deterred from
publishing their results and
technical progress was inhibited." 55 In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the legalization of
abortion led to more widespread
experimentation with alternative techniques, experimentation that continues to this day.
Consequently, hysterotomy has
been all but abandoned as an
appropriate method for termi566
nating pregnancy. 56
Two strands of Supreme
Court abortion jurisprudence
acknowledge the importance and
value of medical innovation and
progress. First, the Court repeatedly has stressed the essential role of the doctor's discretion
in abortion practice, invalidating restrictions that circumscribed such discretion as violating a woman's reproductive
freedom. In Colautti v.
Franklin,the Court reaffirmed
this principle, noting that its
decision in Roe v. Wade accorded
great weight to "the central role
of the physician.., in determining how any abortion was to be
carried out."5
Second, the Supreme Court

consistently has struck down
abortion restrictions that fail to
account for ongoing developments in the standard of medical
care. In PlannedParenthoodv.
Danforth, for example, the Court
struck down a ban on the use of
saline amniocentesis as an
abortion method. The ban flew
in the face of accepted medical
practice, since at that time
saline amniocentesis was employed in "a substantial majority
.. . of all post-first-trimester
abortions."59 The Court further
noted that the ban "appear[ed]
to include within its proscription
the intra-amniotic injection of
prostaglandin... and other
methods that may be developed
in the future and that may
prove highly effective and completely safe."6 ° Indeed, not only
did prostaglandin come to replace saline as the favored
substance for "abortions by
induction," but furthermore,
inductions themselves were later
largely replaced by the newer,
often safer dilation and evacuation (D&E) method of abortion. 1
Similarly, in City ofAkron v.
Akron Reproductive Health
Center, the Supreme Court
struck down a requirement that
all second-trimester abortions be
performed in a hospital. The
Court recognized that the D&E
method had become accepted as
the safest method of performing
most post-first-trimester abortions, and that D&Es could be
performed safely on an out-
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patient basis,62 The Court
noted that both the American
Public Health Association and
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists had
"abandoned [their] prior
recommendation[s] of hospitalization for all second-trimester
abortions."63 The Court concluded that" 'present medical
knowledge' convincingly undercuts Akron's justification" for the
requirement.64
"Partial-birth abortion"
bans are frequently - and
erroneously - thought to pro-

hibit only the abortion procedure known as either "intact
dilation and evacuation" (intact
D&E) or "dilation and extraction" (D&X). While definitions of
intact D&E/D&X vary, there is
general consensus that it is not
really a distinct procedure, but
rather, a variant of the D&E
method of abortion, which is
used in more than 96 percent of
all post-first-trimester abortions. 65 Many physicians believe, and several federal courts
have found, that intact D&E/
D&X has specific safety advantages and may be the safest
procedure in certain circumstances.66 For example, a federal
district court in Nebraska noted
that "the D&X procedure has
been shown by medical evidence
to be the safest procedure used
by mainstream medical professionals.., in certain circumstances."67 A federal district
court in Michigan observed that

six board-certified doctors all
agree that the intact D&E/D&X
procedure "reduce[s] risks associated with conventional D&Es."68
Even if a law prohibited only
the performance of intact D&Es/
D&Xs, it would still cripple the
ability of doctors to treat their
patients according to their own
best medical judgment. A physician would be unable to use the
procedure that might be the
safest for a particular patient in
the given circumstances. Yet,
the Supreme Court repeatedly
has held that a woman's health
may never be compromised in
order to promote a state interest
in fetal welfare.6 9 A woman is
constitutionally entitled to the
specific abortion procedure that
her physician deems the safest
for her. If that procedure is
outlawed, it is legally irrelevant
that other, generally safe,
procedures might still be available options. For this reason, it
would be unconstitutional even
to ban procedures such as the
rarely used hysterotomy; although the procedure is seldom
warranted, there are rare circumstances in which it would be
the safest option.7 0 For any
woman facing such circumstances, a ban would unconstitutionally "force [her] and her
physician to terminate her
pregnancy by methods more
dangerous to her health than
the method outlawed.7
Courts should not sanction a
ban on a single abortion proce-
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dure for the additional reason
that this would set a dangerous
precedent of approving legislative micro-management of
medical practice. Such interference would inevitably chill the
experimentation and free flow of
ideas necessary for medical
innovation and progress. It is
telling to recall how the "partial-birth abortion" campaign
arose: it was a political response
to a physician's scholarly presentation of a technique he
believed represented an advance
in safe abortion practice. In the
already chilly climate for reproductive freedom, in which everdeclining numbers of doctors are
willing to perform abortions, one
can only imagine the deepfreeze impact this development
is likely to have on other doctors'
willingness to present their own
ideas or to learn new abortion
techniques from their colleagues.
IV. CONCLUSION
"Partial-birth abortions"
cannot constitutionally be
banned. The non medical terminology and vague definitions
contained in the so-called "partial-birth abortion" bans in fact
render them virtual abortion
bans, prohibiting the safest and
most common abortion procedures used throughout pregnancy. As such, these laws
cannot survive constitutional
scrutiny. But even if the laws

could be revised to prohibit a
single specific procedure, they
would still be unconstitutional,
not advancing the government's
interest in potential life, and
undermining its interest in the
actual lives and health of pregnant women.
Notes
Shortly before this article went
to press, on October 23, 1998, a
Buffalo-area doctor who performed abortions, Dr. Barnett A.
Slepian, was shot to death,
apparently by a sniper who lay
in wait outside his home. This
tragic murder illustrates the
extreme lengths to which some
"pro-life" activists will go in
pursuit of their ultimate goal -criminalizing and deterring as
many abortions as possible.
"Partial-birth abortion" bans
serve the same goal, contributing to the increasingly chilly,
hostile environment faced by all
abortion providers. Therefore,
we dedicate this article to the
memory of Dr. Slepian and the
other courageous, compassionate women and men who have
sacrificed their lives -- all too
literally -- to the cause of preserving womens' health and
freedom.
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